Changelog

7 September 2026

Add a device by QR. From a signed-in browser, Account → Add a device shows a code; scan it with your phone's camera, type your password, and the phone is in. Your browser stays signed in. The code contains your Secret Key and expires in five minutes — don't share your screen while it's up.
A Show/Hide button on the password field, on the unlock screen and on the phone's add-this-device screen, so you can check what you typed before submitting it.
Opening /app/#/link without a freshly scanned code (your browser's address bar tends to remember it) now takes you to the unlock screen instead of a dead end, and the registration screen explains how to add an existing account to a new browser.

Copy buttons for the Emergency Kit. The recovery phrase copies as a numbered list, so the words the drill asks for can be looked up by reading rather than counting.
A landing page that actually opens the vault, and this changelog.

The web vault opened. Register, unlock, and store, read, edit and delete entries in the browser — with all encryption performed on your device.
Emergency Kit ceremony at signup: a Secret Key and a 24-word recovery phrase, with a written-it-down check that cannot be skipped, because nobody — including us — can recover a vault without them.
Recovery from the Kit on a new device, for a lost, stolen or wiped one. Recovering signs out every other device, which is what you want when the reason you are recovering is that a device is gone.
Device list, with the ability to revoke a device and end its sessions immediately.
Your client now verifies the signature over your own device list, so a server that hid, added or un-revoked a device would be detected rather than trusted.
Vault locks on reload, tab close, an explicit Lock, or fifteen minutes idle. Signing in and unlocking are separate: the vault keys are never written to disk.

Per-device authentication using post-quantum signatures, replacing password-only sign-in. Each device holds its own key and proves possession of it.
Sessions are bearer tokens stored only as hashes, so a copy of the database is not a set of working credentials.
Encrypted entry storage, with a previous encrypted version retained on every change so a stolen session cannot irreversibly destroy a vault.
Changing your device list now requires a signature only your unlocked account key can produce — a stolen session can read, but cannot add a device or lock you out.

catkeys.app went live: accounts, email-blind identity, and Emergency Kit recovery, with the server holding only ciphertext and a keyed hash of each address.
Post-quantum cryptography throughout — ML-KEM-1024 and ML-DSA-87 — with no classical public-key cryptography anywhere in the system.